

EXHIBIT NO. 177

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1. Dispatch #234 dated May 18, 1939 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, transmitting a proposal of Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma, and attached memoranda dated June 13 and May 22, 1939.
2. Dispatch #242 dated May 23, 1939 from Counselor Dooman, Tokyo, to State Department.
3. Dispatch #245 dated May 26, 1939 from Counselor Dooman, Tokyo, to State Department.
4. Information Letter No. 3936 dated June 7, 1939 from Eugene H. Dooman, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Tokyo, to Secretary of State concerning "Japan's Foreign Policy in Relation to the Situation in Europe".
5. Dispatch #265 dated June 8, 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State Department.
6. Memorandum dated July 1, 1939 for the President from Secretary Hull, concerning the Hiranuma proposal.
7. Dispatch #187 dated July 7, 1939 from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo, concerning reply to Embassy's dispatch #234, above.
8. Letter of Instruction #1767 dated July 8, 1939 from Secretary of State to American Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Tokyo, in reply to Hiranuma proposal.
9. Dispatch #319 dated July 10, 1939 from Counselor Dooman, Tokyo, to State Department, in reply to dispatch #187, above.
10. Dispatch #196 dated July 13, 1939 from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo, in reply to Embassy's dispatch #319.
11. Dispatch #194 dated July 12, 1939 from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo, reporting conversation between Secretary Hull and Japanese Ambassador on July 10, 1939.
12. Memorandum dated July 10, 1939 of conversation concerning "American rights and interests in China", between Secretary Hull and Japanese Ambassador Mr. Kensuke Horinouchi, at which time Secretary Hull protested the Japanese bombings of American nationals and property in Chungking, China, and made general reply to the Hiranuma proposal.
13. Dispatch # 376 dated July 31, 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State Department, acknowledging receipt of Instruction Letter #1767.
14. Dispatch #235 dated August 1, 1939 from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo.
15. Dispatch #239 dated August 2, 1939 from State Department to American Embassy, Tokyo.
16. Dispatch #384 dated August 3, 1939 from Counselor Dooman, Tokyo, to State Department (two parts).
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19. Dispatch #390 dated August 5, 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State Department.
20. Dispatch #393 dated August 8, 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State Department.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

June 13, 1939.

On June 12 Mr. Grew delivered to the Secretary in person the original of the message quoted in Tokyo's 234, May 18, 5 p.m. The message is not signed; is not dated; and is typed on plain, unheaded paper.

MSH

FE:MMH:REK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

May 22, 1939

~~MM:~~

PA/H

Mr. Hornbeck:

The Japanese Prime Minister's message transmitted through the Foreign Office, and contained in the attached telegram from Tokyo (no. 234, May 18, 5 p.m.), is evidently inspired by his concern lest in the event of a European war the United States might align itself with the so-called "democratic powers" with the result that the United States and Japan would confront each other from opposite camps. It is because of this concern that Japan would especially regard the eventuality of a European war to be detrimental to Japanese interests.

In essence the message advances the thesis that conditions making for true world peace can only be obtained through assuring to nations their "proper places in the world", and there is a scarcely disguised plea that the political thinking of this Government with regard to the so-called "have-not" nations be revised. Toward this end there is apparently an attempt to capitalize upon the known interest of the American Government and people in peace and the avoidance of a catastrophe such as a general world war.

FE:Ballantine:EJL
Sturgeon

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

July 8 1939

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
MAY 23 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RR

FROM GRAY

Tokyo

Dated May 18, 1939

Rec'd 7:10 a.m.

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN
MAY 23 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 23 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

5:34, May 18, 8 p.m.

At my conference today with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Arida handed me the following message which the Prime Minister requested me to deliver personally to the Secretary of State on my forthcoming visit to Washington in the hope that the message may also be brought to the attention of the President:

"At present there is a serious antagonism among the nations of Europe and no one can assure that there will be no clash in the near future. If, by mischance, war is to break out, its consequences would be practically beyond our imagination, the indescribable sufferings of hundreds of millions of people as well as the complete destruction of civilization would ensue. It is, therefore, in the interest of all nations to exert our effort to prevent the occurrence of such a calamity, and, I believe, that is the only viable foundation on which the United States and Japan since 1901 have been able to negotiate outside the scope of the League of Nations."

Then

740.00/1531

Confidential File

GIB

-2- #234, May 18, 5 p.m., from Tokyo.

Then what are the causes of this antagonism in Europe? There may be contentions on both sides but on cool scrutiny of the European situations since the World War we come to the conclusion that, although Germany and Italy may be advised to be more patient, Great Britain and France also have a great deal to reconsider.

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Undoubtedly the intention of the United States Government is to prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe and thus to save Europe from the misery of war. Similarly it is the ardent wish of Japan that nations should have their own proper places in the world and thus the true world peace might be established and maintained. I, for myself, am doing my utmost to realize this ideal, and on this point, I believe, will be found the possibility of much closer cooperation between Japan and America as well as the foundation of a deeper mutual understanding between the two nations".

GREV

RR:WTC

At present there is a serious antagonism among the nations of Europe and no one can assure that there will be no clash in the near future. If, by mischance, war is to break out, its consequences would be practically beyond our imagination and the indescribable sufferings of hundreds of millions of people as well as the complete destruction of civilization would ensue. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary for us to exert our effort to prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe, and, I believe, that is the duty mainly incumbent on the United States and Japan since these two Powers are situated outside the scope of European conflict.

Then what are the causes of this antagonism in Europe? There may be contentions on both sides but on cool scrutiny of the European situations since the World War we come to the conclusion that, although Germany and Italy may be advised to be more patient, Great Britain and France also have a great deal to re-consider.

Undoubtedly the intention of the United States Government is to prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe and thus to save Europe from the misery of war. Similarly, it is the ardent wish of Japan that nations should have their

- 2 -

their own proper places in the world and thus the true world peace might be established and maintained. I, for myself, am doing my utmost to realize this ideal, and on this point, I believe, will be found the possibility of much closer co-operation between Japan and America as well as the foundation of a deeper mutual understanding between the two nations.

[This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)]

TOKYO

Dated May 23, 1939

Rec'd 5:01 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington, 242, May 23, 11 p. m.

(Strictly Confidential for the Secretary, Please Restrict Distribution)

Our 234, May 18, 5 p. m.

One. I dined this evening privately with the Prime Minister who had sent me word that he wished to explain his purpose in addressing the letter to you.

Two. The first part of his discourse ran substantially along the lines of his letter. I pointed out that there would have to be the closest collaboration between the United States and Japan if they were to move jointly toward seeking a solution of the troubles in Europe and I doubted whether such collaboration were possible so long as Japan adhered to its policies and actions in China. The Prime Minister said that public opinion in Japan would not permit of the settlement of the conflict with China being made a condition precedent to the American-Japanese move which he had in mind. The following is a summary of his statement explaining the Japanese position.

Three. Japan had no legal obligation to enter the European war on the side of Great Britain but she believed that she had a moral responsibility. Her fleet and merchant marine were used in operations against the enemy she wrestled Shantung from Germany and later restored it to China and she cooperated in other ways toward bringing about the ultimate victory but the only thanks she got was the abrogation by Great Britain of their alliance. Further Great Britain along with the United States was complacent when China began to whittle down the fruits of Japan's victory over Russia. Finally the Washington and London naval treaties together with the Nine Power Treaty completely tied Japan's hands. There was bound to be a revulsion to these restrictions and that came with the Manchuria incident in 1931. The Prime Minister said that so strong was the sense of grievance of the Japanese people that the Japanese Government could not, even if it wished, make peace with China on terms which did not assure Japan economic security, and that under existing world conditions such security could not be provided by restoration of the status quo ante. He had already given careful thought to the question I had raised with regard to the need for making peace with China and he had come to the conclusion that it would be impossible to dissociate the Far Eastern problem from the conditions of unrest which prevailed in Europe and elsewhere and that this problem is capable of solution by negotiation only when the conditions which lie at the root of the European problem as well as of the Far Eastern problem can be considered.

Four. I asked the Prime Minister whether he believed it likely that the American people would look with favor on American collaboration with Japan in approaching the difficulties in Europe when Japan herself was considered to be guilty of the same acts of which Germany and Italy stood condemned and when moreover the press is almost daily reporting acts of Japanese violations of American rights in China. The Prime Minister replied that in respect of the first point he hoped that the American Government at least realized that Japan had not intended or expected to engage in a war with China. In respect of the second point he admitted that there is justification for complaint but he said that Japan's first preoccupation must be the success of her military operations. Nevertheless if the powers could come together to find by negotiation a solution of the world's troubles these issues involving American rights in China could be disposed of without difficulty. In the meantime the Government would continue its efforts to satisfy the American position with regard to the open door but one difficulty was the sense of grievance to which he had previously referred.

Five. In conclusion the Prime Minister said that this might prove to be the last opportunity to save the world from chaos. He was prepared to sound out Germany and Italy with regard to the holding of a conference such as he had suggested if the President were prepared at the same time to sound out Great Britain and France.

Six. He urged on me the supreme importance of secrecy with regard to his approach.

DOOMAN.

EMB: NK

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUL 8 1939
TOKYO
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Dated May 20, 1939

Secretary of State
Washington

Received 11:35 a.m.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 20 1939
Department of State

245, May 26, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 740.00/1 31

Our 234, May 18, 5 p.m.

One. The Ambassador immediately before his departure and I more recently have had conversations with leading Japanese, including members of the Cabinet, which give me the definite impression that, in view of the way in which events in Europe are shaping, there is taking place here an anxious search for a position which would afford Japan security.

Two. In a conversation on May 16 with the Ambassador and me one well informed person stated that those who think as he does, who had sufficient influence to defeat the proposal of an alliance with Germany and Italy, are convinced that the only safe course for Japan to follow is to restore good relations with the democratic states especially the United States and to make a strong plea for some indication by the United States

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740.00/1588

EDA - 2 - #235, May 26, 8 p.m. from Tokyo

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 States that restoration of good relations with Japan was desired, a step which would greatly support those who were opposing any new anti-comintern commitment. The Ambassador replied that he could not recommend to his Government that it give such indication unless Japan could first offer evidence of intention to make peace with China on terms which could be expected to meet the Chinese terms and command the approval of the American Government. The informant said that an indication of Japan's peace terms might better come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs; that he would report the conversation to Arita; and that he would urge Arita to defer any new anti-comintern commitment until the Ambassador had time to communicate with the Department.

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 Three. When I talked with Arita on the 17th I found that he was familiar with the conversation of the preceding day. He was, however, excited over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations and was in no mood to talk of anything else. In view of this conversation and of the conversation which the Ambassador had with the Foreign Minister on the following day, as reported in our telegram under reference, the Ambassador felt as I then did that the views expressed by the informant referred to in paragraph two would be discredited.

However, in subsequent conversation with

EDA - 3 - #235, May 26, 8 p.m. from Tokyo

high official mentioned in my strictly confidential 242, May 23, 11 p.m., and with one of his personal advisers, I was told that Japan did not want to tie up with Germany and Italy, as there are in those countries under surface currents which gravely prejudice confidence in any political arrangement which Japan might make with them. The thought was subtly conveyed that if war broke out in Europe there would be little security for Japan in seeking to maintain neutrality and that Japan would greatly prefer to be associated on terms of close friendship with the democratic states than with Germany and Italy through an alliance. I might add that there was expressed doubt whether the latter countries could defeat the democratic states.

Five. There is in these and other authenticated evidence that the President's message to Germany and Italy and other signs of probability that the United States would not be indifferent to a war in Europe have awakened some Japanese to the risk of involvement with the United States figuratively by way of Europe if not directly across the Pacific. The high official referred to in paragraph four said to me that Japan would be prepared eventually and under certain conditions to moderate its peace terms to China; but this willingness

if

EDA - 4 - #235, May 26, 8 p.m. from Tokyo

If it exists springs not from any moral regeneration but from realization that Japan's security can be safeguarded so long as war threatens in Europe only by liquidating the conflict with China. It is impossible at this time to determine whether the more rational views herein reported are those which predominate within the Japanese Government but the standing of those who utter them entitles them to much weight.

DOOMAN

KLP:RR



THE FOREIGN OFFICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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/

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Tokyo, June 7, 1939.

No. 2956

SUBJECT: JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO THE
SITUATION IN GREECE.



EXACTLY CONFIDENTIAL: FOR THE OFFICIAL AND UNDER SECRETARY

740.00/1012

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I had the honor to receive your letter of June 6, 1939, in relation to present or anticipated certain trends in Japanese thought with reference to her policy in relation to the situation now prevailing in Greece. I observe that there

were

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were elements in Japan - not to be confused with certain congenial, but, withal ineffectual, persons educated abroad who have been telling us that reaction to Japan's China policy was "just around the corner" - who realized that, in the event of a war in Europe, the maintenance by Japan of neutrality between the democratic and totalitarian camps would afford Japan little security, and that national security could be assured in the long run only by liquidating the conflict with China. I was not unaware of the need for resting an observation of this nature on a reasonably firm basis, and it is my purpose in this despatch to lay before the Department the circumstances, some of personal knowledge and the others which derive by deduction, on which my view was based. As there is no discussion in the press or in any other public forum of the question whether or not Japan should align itself with Germany and Italy - indeed, any reference by the press to this question is officially interdicted - information with regard to thought trends has come to me largely by word of mouth.

The first conversation which needs to be recorded took place on May 16, at a luncheon which was given in honor of the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew by a Japanese who, while holding no official position, is a close friend and confidant of high officials

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officials of the Court and of Prince Kanaye, Minister without Portfolio, and Teruaki Higo, Minister of the Interior. He is in a position to exercise through various contacts considerable influence on the Government. As we left the table, our host drew the Ambassador and me into another room and talked substantially along the following lines:

Although the Japanese Government has decided not to conclude a military alliance with Germany and Italy, there was being exerted on the Government, not only by Germany and Italy but by reactionary groups in Japan, strong pressure toward entering into some arrangement with the latter countries which would reaffirm the solidarity among the nations whose policies were opposed by the democratic nations. The groups to which he belonged had succeeded in defeating the proposal to conclude the alliance and are now doing their best to defeat the "strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact", or at least to prevent it from becoming a political link with Germany and Italy; but it was difficult to meet the argument of those who had advocated the alliance and are now favoring close association with Germany and Italy, that Japan cannot afford

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to be isolated. Germany and Italy are urging Japan "to come over to their side", while the democratic nations are turning to Japan a very cold shoulder. If, therefore, the democratic nations, especially the United States, could indicate to Japan that restoration of good relations with Japan is desired and that the way is open for Japan to align herself with the democratic nations, but not against the totalitarian states, those Japanese who are working for precisely those objectives would have their hand greatly strengthened.

The Ambassador said that he was very much interested in the views just expressed, but that it must be obvious that the restoration of peace and good relations between Japan and China must be a condition precedent to the restoration of good relations between Japan and the United States and other democratic nations. He could not, therefore, recommend that his Government give any gesture of welcome to Japan unless he were first satisfied that the terms of peace with China which Japan had in view could be reconciled with China's peace terms and would meet with the approval of the American Government.

Our host then talked very vaguely about the readiness of Japan to withdraw from central and south China, but when asked to give specifications he replied that

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that a full statement on Japanese peace terms might better come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He undertook to report the conversation to Mr. Arita, and to suggest to Mr. Arita that he give the Ambassador a precise explanation of Japanese objectives in China during the conversation which the Ambassador had arranged to have with Mr. Arita on May 16th.

Mr. and Mrs. Arita were entertaining the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew at luncheon on May 17, and Mr. Grew prearranged with me that I should endeavor during the luncheon party to ascertain from Mr. Arita whether our host of the previous day had consulted him. I accordingly took advantage of a favorable opportunity to engage Mr. Arita in conversation. I found that he was quite familiar with the discussion of the previous day. He said that there had been a suggestion that he give Mr. Grew an assurance that Japan would withhold any action to "strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact" until Mr. Grew returned to Washington and had an opportunity to discuss with his Government the possibility of making to Japan some "gesture of welcome". Mr. Arita said that there was no important opinion in the country unfavorable to the measure which had been proposed to combat communistic activities, and that, if the time became ripe for the conclusion of the agreement under discussion with Germany and Italy, the Japanese Government intended to proceed with it.

He

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He could, however, assure Mr. Drew that the agreement would contain no military, political or economic clauses; but with this proviso - if it were found that these activities were being instigated by the Soviet Government, the counter-measures proposed would have to be directed against that Government.

Mr. Arita then passed on to the negotiations between the Soviet and British Governments concerning the "common front against aggression". He said that Japan is very anxious to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe, but that Japan could not ignore the fact that Russia straddled Europe and Asia, and that, whether Japan liked it or not, its policies and actions form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act and react on each other. The British Ambassador had, he said, given him definite assurances that the arrangement under discussion by the British and Soviet Governments would specifically be made inapplicable, but he (Mr. Arita) replied that any arrangement which formed the basis for the close collaboration contemplated by Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union in respect of their common interests in Europe would be bound to bring about similar collaboration among them in the conduct of their policies in the Far East. He delivered himself at some length and with considerable show of heat over Sir Robert Craigie's insistence that the assurances given Mr. Arita should dissolve any Japanese anxiety with

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with regard to the effective scope of the proposed arrangement. Mr. Arita concluded the conversation with me with the observation that decision over Japan's attitude vis-à-vis the situation developing in Europe would have to be withheld until results of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations were known.

A full account of the Ambassador's conversation on May 18 will be found in his telegram No. 235, May 18, 7 p.m.

The impressions which the Ambassador and I had formed of Mr. Arita's views as expressed in the conversations of May 17 and 18 agreed in every respect. It seemed to us that Mr. Arita, far from indicating any eagerness to find a way to approach the democratic nations, was preoccupied with the effects on the Far East of the establishment of the "front against aggression" and was not in a conciliatory mood. The Ambassador came, therefore, to the conclusion, as I did, that there was no justification for believing that desire to bring Japan into line with the democratic nations as against the totalitarian nations animated the Japanese Government as such.

Whether by accident or by design, I was approached on the same day, May 18, by a Japanese hitherto unknown to me but who had made the acquaintance of the Ambassador as a fellow passenger during

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U.S. -
during a voyage across the Pacific, with the suggestion that I have a "chat", as he put it, with the Prime Minister. I asked the gentleman to call again, as I wished to consider the matter. I informed the Ambassador of the call and of the suggestion that I have a talk with the Prime Minister. Mr. Grew said that he had formed a favorable impression of Mr. Fujii, the person who had called on me, and that he saw no reason why I should not return a favorable reply. When Mr. Fujii called again, I said that I would be glad to have an opportunity to make the acquaintance of the Prime Minister, but that I had heard rumors of the possibility of a change of government and wondered, therefore, whether a call at that time would be opportune. Returning on the following day, Mr. Fujii brought an invitation from Baron Hiranuma to dinner on May 23, when he intended to explain his purpose in sending through Mr. Grew his message to the Secretary, and word to the effect that no change in the government was impending. I accepted the invitation. Mr. Fujii then emphasized the importance of keeping a profound secret the forthcoming talk. He said that Baron Hiranuma's political position was reasonably secure, but that the alignment of factions within the Government over European policy was so delicate as to require that the Prime Minister act very cautiously.

Mr.

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Mr. Fujii called for me on the evening of May 23. As we went in my car, which bears an Embassy license tag, Mr. Fujii proposed that we alight some distance from the Prime Minister's private residence and go the rest of the way on foot; which we did. At the gate of the residence there stood a number of policemen, who, although obviously surprised by seeing a foreigner, made no attempt to stop me. The servants were prepared for my visit, but I have reason to believe that they, as well as two female relations of the Prime Minister's who served us later at dinner, had no knowledge whatever of my identity. It might be added that the residence, which is situated in the suburbs, is small and quite unpretentious and would barely grace a small tradesman. These details, while inconsequential, may perhaps reflect my impressions at the moment.

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Baron ^{Hirayama} Hiranuma received me very courteously. He said that he unfortunately had few opportunities to meet foreigners and thus to receive at first hand the impressions of foreigners with regard to conditions in various parts of the world. The situation in Europe was, in his view, a delicate one, and he felt confident that he could obtain from an American a more objective appraisal of that situation than he would be likely to procure from an European.

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I expressed regret that I was not in a position to give him any information other than that which was public knowledge. There then ensued a colloquy on the situation in Europe, during which Baron Hiranuma displayed knowledge not only of a factual nature but of political trends in Europe which surprised me. One of the points brought out which, in his view, made for danger in Europe was that Chancellor Hitler - with the objectives which he has in mind for Germany to achieve - provides an issue around which all elements in Great Britain can rally: the imperialists, who do not propose to tolerate a Germany which can pretend to equality with Great Britain; the industrialists, who fear German commercial competition; and, finally, the Jews, radicals and even the Germanophiles, who vie with each other in their hatred of Hitler.

Baron Hiranuma then said that the possibility of a war arising in Europe was one which he contemplated with horror. It would inevitably result in the total destruction of civilization, as no nation, however remote from the seat of war, could hope to escape the eventual consequences even though it might be fortunate to avoid direct involvement. He had publicly stated on several occasions that Japan could never be a democracy or a totalitarian state, and that Japan could make its greatest contribution by bringing together in harmonious and peaceful relations the two groups of nations. There were, he continued, elements in Japan which considered that

Japan.

-11-

Japan could not afford to maintain a condition of isolation and that her security demanded that she enter into "special relations" with Germany and Italy. He was insisting, however, that Japan follow what he termed "moral diplomacy". A nation's existence was not to be measured by decades, and it was essential, therefore, that statesmen charged with the destinies of nations fix their attention on long term objectives rather than on gaining favorable tactical positions, which were after all, ephemeral. The most important of these objectives was a stabilized peace to replace interludes of preparation for the next war. Japan, like the United States, was not directly involved in the troubles of Europe; and it was his thought that these two nations, which were the only Great Powers situated outside of Europe, were in a position to exercise a moderating influence on Europe. To exercise that influence was a duty which they owed their own peoples, for the downfall of Europe would inevitably bring with it the downfall of the rest of the world. In his opinion, the first step which had to be taken was to check the tendency toward the division of Europe into two politically hostile camps. He wondered whether the views of the American Government were responsive to those which he had expressed in his message to the Secretary.

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I said that the American Government had taken a lead, in respect of both time and emphasis, in making known the fact that nations are today interdependent and that discord between any nations is a matter of concern to all others. His message to the Secretary did not, I said, contain any definitive suggestion as to how the United States and Japan might proceed toward averting war in Europe. The principal difficulty, in my opinion, in the way of the collaboration which he had suggested in talking to me was Japan's policies and actions in China. I felt certain that the American Government would, in other more happy circumstances, have welcomed Japanese cooperation toward alleviating the threat to peace in Europe which, the great majority of Americans believed, arises from the policies and actions of Germany and Italy; and I doubted whether the American people would favor collaboration with a nation which it believed to be following in the Far East precisely those policies and actions that are considered to be the root of the trouble in Europe. I also said that the American people have laid before them nearly every day reports of bombings of American property and of other instances of violations of American rights and interests in China. The Foreign Office was trying to exculpate the Japanese military authorities by pleading military necessity or inadvertence, but enough had happened to justify belief that

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the Japanese authorities, in China at least, were systematically and deliberately trying to expel American and other foreign interests from China. The views of the American people in these respects were, I said, very definitely formed. I could not but feel, therefore, that the adjustment of the conflict in China on terms satisfactory to all concerned would have to be a condition precedent to that degree of collaboration between the United States and Japan which could reasonably be expected to bring about the desired results in Europe.

The Prime Minister observed that he was well aware of the state of feeling which prevailed in the United States against Japan. The American people had assumed that Japan had deliberately provoked the conflict in China with a view to seizing the more populated and productive parts of that country, but he felt confident that the American Government realized that it had not been the original intention or desire of Japan to do anything more than to protect its rights in North China. It was also supposed by Americans that Japan intended to close the Open Door in China; and to his regret the actions of the Japanese authorities in China were not entirely reconcilable with the desire of the Japanese Government to respect foreign rights and interests in China.

But

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But he wondered whether the American Government realized that the Japanese people labored under a very real feeling of grievance against the Occidental Powers, especially Great Britain. When the Great War broke out, Japan was an ally of Great Britain. There were no legal obligations on Japan to support her ally, but she conceived that she had a moral obligation to do so. She accordingly declared war against Germany, her navy undertook operations against the German fleet in the Pacific, her merchant marine cooperated in various ways, and finally her military forces eliminated Germany from Shantung. "The only thanks we got from Great Britain", continued Baron Hironuma, "was the abrogation of that very alliance which inspired Japan to support Great Britain." Again, the rights which Japan had acquired in Manchuria as a result of her war with Russia and later by agreement with China were essential to Japan; nevertheless, the efforts of China to prejudice those rights were regarded by Great Britain and the United States with complacency, if not with benevolence; China took courage to persist, with the result that Japan had to resort to force in 1931 to protect those rights. Finally, the Japanese people came to the conclusion that the Nine Power Treaty and the Naval Treaties operated, not to stabilize peace in the Far East, but to bind Japan against safeguarding her interests in China. So long as the Japanese people

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people felt that it had just cause for grievance, it was politically impossible for his government or any government which would succeed him to bring about complete equality of opportunity in China for all nations.

The Japanese people, Baron Hiranuma continued, have considerable sympathy for Germany and Italy, as they conceive these countries to be in many important respects in the same position as Japan. It was not to be expected that Germany would have permitted herself to remain under the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, nor that Italy would have been content to be dependent on other nations for supplies of raw materials. At the same time, the consequences of efforts on their part to redress their grievances by force, or of the stubborn refusal of the democratic nations to offer to correct these grievances, could not possibly be confined to the protagonists in the European quarrel but would have to be shared by other nations. He referred to my observation that the settlement of the China conflict would probably have to be a condition precedent to joint American-Japanese efforts to moderate the situation in Europe. If that were to be the view of the American Government, any hope of proceeding along the course which he had in mind would have to be abandoned. The objectives which Japan has had in China are essential for her security in a world of sanctions, embargoes,
closing

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closing of markets to foreign competition, and lack of free access to raw materials, and so long as such conditions exist any moderation of her objectives in China and, therefore, of her peace terms, could not be considered. Nevertheless if conditions could be brought about which would assure to all nations markets for the world's goods on the basis of quality and price and supplies of the materials which they needed, the importance to Japan of securing a market and sources of raw materials in China would greatly diminish; and by the same token there would not be the urge that there now is on Germany and Italy to expand at the expense of weaker and smaller nations. Baron Hiranuma stated that the conditions which brought about the situations in the Far East and Europe are not local but universal in character, and that neither situation could be settled in a manner calculated to bring about a stabilized peace unless the conditions which brought them about were corrected.

Baron Hiranuma said that the belief was widely held abroad that Japan was considering a military alliance with Germany and Italy. He had endeavored to explain frankly the basis of Japanese sympathy for Germany and Italy, and he could say quite definitely that the basis of what appeared to be a concerting of Japanese policy with that of Germany and Italy lay in the fact that all three countries are in the same economic strategic position. He personally

-17-

personally was of the opinion that Japan, whose government would for all time to come rest on the sanctity of the Imperial Family, could not tie itself by special relations to any foreign government whose stability depended on the continued existence and political prestige of one individual. There were both in Germany and Italy political currents flowing beneath the surface which, in his view, would gravely prejudice confidence in any political arrangement, such as an alliance, which Japan might make with those countries. Hidden dissident elements would be certain to make themselves felt in time of war and thus are to be reckoned as a threat to the success of German and Italian arms.

At this point we were interrupted by notice that dinner was served. The conversation during dinner was not in any way pertinent to the subject of this despatch, being confined to discussions of points in Chinese philosophy, personal reminiscences, and so on, the Prime Minister discoursing in a most interesting manner.

Returning to his study, the Prime Minister said that he wished to draw together the various threads of our conversation, as follows:

The

-16-

The United States and Japan were the only powers which could help to prevent the crystallization of the trend toward the division of Europe into armed camps. There can, however, be no confident hope that a permanent peace can be established until the world-wide economic and political conditions which bring about unrest in Europe and in the Far East can be corrected; and if an international conference can be called to solve the problems which create unrest, Japan would be prepared to agree to the inclusion of the Far Eastern situation among the problems to be discussed. Before any call for such a conference could be issued, Great Britain, and France, and Germany and Italy, would have to be sounded out. If the President were prepared to make a confidential approach to the European democracies; he would be glad to approach Germany and Italy; and, if there were returned favorable replies by these nations, he would be glad to have the President call the conference under such conditions as might be agreed upon after discussion through normal diplomatic channels.

I wish to make it clear, before setting forth certain conclusions which I draw from these conversations, that I do not put forward the views of those Japanese - even though they be persons of great importance and influence - who harbor hopes of restoring good relations with

-19-

with the democratic nations, as being necessarily the views of the Japanese Government. These are, however, the views of a powerful element in the government: they may prevail or they may not, but they cannot be ignored.

Any observer who is in any way sensitive to things not seen would, if he were in Tokyo today, become aware of the growing fear for security against the gathering storm in Europe. I should perhaps add parenthetically that the European situation today has assumed primary proportions, and that it would be visionary to suppose that the present confusion concerning the course which Japan should follow is due to despondence over the apparently ineffectual hostilities in China. The Army and other elements which have thus far controlled China policy have assumed that the Far Eastern conflict could be permanently and completely insulated against repercussions from situations elsewhere, as they did not look to American and other accidental armed intervention in that conflict. Although reference has been made in the Embassy's telegrams to the effects of the President's message to Chancellor Hitler, I do not believe that I could, by further reference to that message, exaggerate the impulse which it had toward persuading the Japanese Government to realize that there may be grave danger of involvement with the United States "not directly across the Pacific but by way of Europe", as one Japanese put it to me. I think, however, place that observation in proper perspective. A threat by the United States to eject Japan from China would, I am confident,

be

-10-

be resisted. But if war were to break out in Europe with the United States participating on the side of Great Britain and France, the outcome in the view of those Japanese who think along rational lines would admit of no doubt. With Germany and Italy crushed, the prospect of confronting the victors would not be a palatable one to Japan.


There are, therefore, in the situation which seems to be developing but two courses for Japan to follow - either to go over unreservedly to the totalitarian side, or to restore good relations with those nations which, in the opinion of one element of the Japanese Government, would be the victors. True, in rejecting the proposal to join Germany and Italy in an alliance, Japan provisionally chose a third course - neutrality. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether there are many Japanese who confidently believe that neutrality would afford security. The arguments of those who believe in the superior power of Germany and Italy are obvious and simple: Japan has only to associate herself with these countries and wait for the European war to pick China like a ripe plum. But, for those Japanese who have other views concerning the power of Germany and Italy, there is but one way by which Japan's security can be safeguarded, and that is to bring the conflict with China to an end on some reasonable terms. Here again I wish to make it clear that the desire for a settlement of the conflict does not derive from moral regeneration but from realization of stark facts.

In ,

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In concluding this despatch, which is already unconsciously long, I wish briefly to allude to the discrepancy between the attitude of the Prime Minister as indicated in his conversation with me and that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose preoccupations over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations has already been mentioned. It is obvious that the desire of the Prime Minister for American collaboration to bring about peace in Europe (and in the Far East) cannot be reconciled with the readiness, which is almost an eagerness, on the part of the Foreign Minister to meet a fancied threat from Great Britain. These two points of view reflect conflicting policies, and which of these policies will prevail may perhaps be decided by events of the next few days.

Respectfully yours,



Eugene H. Lochan,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

EHT:G

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
JUN 15 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AC

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Tokyo

From Tokyo June 8, 1939

Rec'd 8:05 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 10 - 1939
Department of State

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
JUN 14 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

265, June 8, 7 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Our 245, May 26, 8 p.m.

One. The Polish Ambassador gave me in strict confidence an account of his conversation yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows: (a) He told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he had heard that there had been renewed pressure on Japan to adhere to the German Italian alliance and he inquired whether there had been any change in the negative decision taken in April by the Japanese Government. The Foreign Minister replied that there had been no (repeat no) change but that Japan's position would have to be reexamined upon the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations concerning an anti-aggression pact. (b) The Ambassador then asked for clarification of the Japanese attitude vis a vis the difficulties between Poland and Germany. The Foreign Minister said that his reply to that question would be found in his presentation of the four cardinal points Japan's attitude toward European problems. The first point is that Japan maintains friendly relations with both Germany and Poland and therefore

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- 2 - #265, June 8, 7 p.m., from Tokyo

and therefore hopes that they will peacefully resolve their present difficulties; Japan is prepared, without commitment as to the merits of the causes of their dispute, to lend its good offices toward restoring good relations between the two countries. The second is that without prejudice to Japan's intention to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe, "Her relations with Germany extend beyond the framework of the Anti-Comintern Pact". The third is that the results of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations will determine to a large extent whether or not Japan can avoid involvement in Europe. The fourth is the possibility of Japan and the United States collaborating to bring about a detente in Europe and thus creating opportunity in Europe for laying down a basis of durable peace; the views of the American Government in this respect are being explored. (c) In the general discussion which followed the Foreign Minister again emphasized Japan's concern over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations pointing out that Japan cannot be indifferent to any arrangement which would strengthen the position in the Far East of the Soviet Union. The Ambassador in defense of the British desire to bring the Soviet Union within the anti-aggression front in Europe referred to an innovation of action calculated to prevent the Soviet Union from falling into the arms of Germany. The Foreign Minister

- 3 - #265, June 8, 7 p.m., from Tokyo

Minister ridiculed that possibility whereupon the Ambassador made the rejoinder that his Government has indisputable evidence from both German and Soviet sources that rapprochement between those two countries is now an active question.

Two. The Ambassador gained the very definite impression that the so-called decision with regard to Japanese policy recently referred to by the press is not a definitive decision but merely a conclusion reached by the Cabinet to await the result of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. He believes that the hardening of American sentiment against Germany is largely responsible for the present confusion of the Japanese Government with regard to its European policy, his analysis of local trends following very closely that presented in our telegram under reference.

DOOMAN

HPD

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CH *OK* *JK*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

JUL 1 - 1939

Herewith, for approval:

- (1) Draft of proposed note to Japan. Though it takes off from the Tientsin situation, it raises the whole issue of the Japanese "new order" in China.
- (2) Proposed personal message from the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister of Japan.

Also:

- (3) A personal message (Document No. 3, attached) sent me by the Prime Minister through Ambassador Grew, (to which No. (2) above is the answer). Its drift is that the United States and Japan, as the only two powers outside European conflict, might cooperate to "save Europe from the misery of war".
- (4) A long mail despatch from Dooman (Document No. 4 attached), explains the Prime Minister's message. It relates an amazing conversation between Dooman and Prime Minister Hiranuma. From page 9 on, it is well worth reading. This is, in effect, a private demarche of the Prime Minister to us. On its face, it suggests Japanese-American cooperation in endeavoring to work out a peace agreement between Germany and Italy (through Japan) and France and Great Britain (through us).

7/1/39

If you approve, I plan to send the Japanese note and the reply to the Prime Minister together.

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Department of State

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Washington
July 7, 1939. "Br"
11am By Cable

AMEMBASSY,
TOKYO (JAPAN).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 234, May 18, 5 p.m.

The Department is sending you by pouch the text of a reply to the message quoted in your telegram under reference.

The Department authorizes you, if you feel that a useful purpose would be served thereby, to inform the Foreign Minister orally and in confidence that a reply is en route. If you feel that it would be advantageous to present the reply before the text will have reached you by mail, please so inform the Department by cable, giving a statement of your reasons, whereupon the Department will consider telegraphing the text to you.

This cable was sent in Confidential Code. It should be carefully re-enciphered before being communicated to anyone.

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JUL 8 1939

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M. 19

D. C. R.—No. 80

1-14/3 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

July 8, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL -- FOR STAFF USE ONLY

No. 1767

Eugene H. Dooman, Esquire,
American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
Tokyo.

Sir:

Reference is made to the Embassy's telegram no. 234, May 18, 5 p.m., in which there is given the text of a message from the Prime Minister which was handed to Ambassador Grew by the Minister for Foreign Affairs with the request that Mr. Grew deliver the message personally to me. There is enclosed a reply to this message.

The Department desires to be consulted by telegraph with regard to the question of the time when the reply should be delivered. Therefore, before arranging to call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose of handing the reply to him for transmission to the Prime Minister, please telegraph your opinion whether an opportune time for presentation of the reply has arrived, offering also such comments or suggestions as may occur to you with regard to the text of the proposed reply.


When you deliver the reply, the Department desires that you inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is requested that the reply be regarded as strictly confidential and not for publication.

Very truly yours,

Enclosure:
Reply to Prime
Minister.

FE:MMH:HES
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Handwritten scribbles and initials, including a large 'X' and some illegible marks.

On his return to Washington Ambassador Grew delivered to me personally the message which Your Excellency was so good as to place in his hands through the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have read with unusual interest the expressions of Your Excellency's concern at the existence among the nations of Europe of antagonism which may lead to open conflict, and of Your Excellency's concern as to what the consequences might be to millions of people and to civilization should such antagonism lead to an outbreak of war. In this situation Your Excellency sees it as the duty of the Governments of our two countries, owing to their situation "outside the scope of European conflict" to exert efforts to prevent the occurrence of the casualty envisaged.

I have carefully noted also the statements pertaining to the causes of strained relations in the European situation, the interest of my Government in the preservation of peace, and finally the "ardent wish of Japan" that the relations of nations might be so arranged that true world peace would be established and maintained.

Your Excellency will have no doubt, in the light of the published utterances of the President and myself and of the principles we have advocated and supported, that the Government of the United States wholeheartedly desires to see established and maintained upon the

basis

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basis of fair dealing and fair play between and among nations a condition of true world peace. With especial reference to the situation in Europe, Your Excellency will be apprised of the recent earnest efforts of this Government: the President's identic messages sent on September 26, 1938, to the heads of several European governments which had reached an alarming crisis in their relations; identic messages addressed on April 14, 1939, by the President and myself respectively to the Chancellor of the German Reich and to the Premier of Italy with regard to the possible removal of the pervading threat or fear of a European war.

It would be most gratifying to me, and I may also speak for the President, if there could be found ways for the use of your Government's influence toward discouraging among European governments, especially those governments with which your Government may have special relations, the taking of any action, or the pursuance of any policy, that might endanger the general peace. I am confident that any such contribution as this would constitute a high service to those great sections of humanity which live in fear of the devastation of war.

In further reference to Your Excellency's expressed desire to see a true world peace established and maintained, I venture to observe, in a spirit of frankness which I trust will not be misunderstood, that this objective is made the more remote by the existence and the continuance of armed conflict and consequent political disturbances in the Far East today. Just as the unfolding of events in the European sphere have

their

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their repercussions in the Far East, so, it appears, the prolongation of abnormal conditions in the Far East contribute to causes of unrest in Europe. American opinion is therefore perturbed by the trend of events in the Far East, especially with regard to the methods of Japan in relations with China. *Amund*

If, therefore, it should prove impracticable or inexpedient to make effective contribution at once to the settlement of problems arising in the European area, there nevertheless would be urgent need for the exertion of efforts in connection with disturbed conditions in other geographical areas, especially by those nations which may unhappily now be engaged in armed conflict. It is my view that each peaceful settlement, in whatever geographical sphere, constitutes a stabilizing element and an important step toward improvement in the general world situation.

Your Excellency may be assured of the genuine desire of the President and myself to do all within our power to convert into practical results those principles and hopes to which we have frequently given expression in connection with the foreign relations of the Government of the United States. While this Government does not perceive any practicable steps which it might usefully take at this time in addition to those already taken, this Government is sincerely interested in the suggestion contained in Your Excellency's message, and in giving further consideration to that suggestion would be pleased to have such further information as

Your

Your Excellency may find it agreeable to offer by way of amplifying and making more definitive Your Excellency's concept as to the steps which might usefully be taken toward moderating the situation in Europe.

FE:LDS/MMH:HES
7-7

*with
FELLO
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*PA/B
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[Handwritten signature]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEC 2 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FROM

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

Tokyo

Dated July 10, 1939

Rec'd 7:43 a.m.

RECEIVED
JUL 11 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

W

Hand to Tokyo

319, July 10, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 187, July 8, 11 a.m.

If my assumption is correct that the reply to the message is not definitive, the presenting of it is not (repeat not) a matter of particular urgency. However, I am being asked every few days whether I have received any reaction to the views and definitive suggestion reported in our 242, May 23, 11 p.m. Some indication of the Department's views thereon would be greatly appreciated.

DOOMAN

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Collaboration by the United States and Japan to settle political difficulties in Europe.

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AMEMBASSY,

1939 JUL 13 PM 5 35

Washington,
July 13, 1939.

TOKYO (JAPAN).

196
Your 319, July 10, noon, last mentioned

CONFIDENTIAL.

Handwritten note: "Ten: code was sent... should be... before... Br"

The Department's reply mentioned in our 187, July 8, 11 a.m., follows in part the lines of the first paragraph of the Department's 194, July 12, 6 p.m., especially the latter half. It is indicated in the reply that while this Government does not repeat not have any further steps in mind at the present time this Government is interested in the suggestion which has been advanced and it is intimated in the reply that additional clarifying information might be helpful in our further study of the matter. The reply thus includes indication of our general reaction to the views reported in your 242, May 23, 11 p.m.

In view of the fact that the indications of the reply, as set forth above, are only in summary form, the Department would prefer, unless you perceive substantial objection, that you await the receipt of the full text of the reply before undertaking to acquaint the Foreign Office with the nature of our reply or to indicate our reaction to the views reported expressed in your 242.

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.

JUL 13 1939

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D. C. R.—No. 50

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1939 JUL 12 3 15 July 12, 1939.

EMBASSY,

TOKYO (SAAS).

Confidential.

One/ On occasion of Japanese Ambassador's call on July 10 he expressed a desire that I comment on the question, raised by Mr. Arita with Mr. Grew, of action by our two governments directed toward averting war in Europe. I told him that we regard the preservation of peace of such supreme importance to the future of all nations that we make a distinction between peaceful countries, without reference to their form of government, and countries which are threatening military conquest; that we will collaborate with every peaceful nation and have indicated our desire to cooperate in every practicable way toward peace and toward a restoration to normality of international finance and commerce; and that we have made earnest pleas to the nations of Europe looking to the adjustment by peaceful means of their economic and other relations. I intimated that, while Japan might itself have made or may be making similar efforts, inasmuch as it might appear to other nations that Japan is engaged in military operations

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Washington,

for purposes of conquest, Japan might, by bringing this situation to an end, exercise its fullest influence along with the United States and other countries in efforts to discourage aggression in other parts of the world.

The Ambassador made no repeat no particular comment other than to refer to and deny reports that Japan might enter into a military pact with Germany and Italy.

Two. The Ambassador said also that he would be interested in anything that I might have to say in regard to this Government's concern over the possible detriment to American interests arising from possible Japanese policies for permanent control over China and in regard to the reported apprehension of this Government that the Japanese occupation of Hainan is part of a plan of permanent military conquest, subjects which the Ambassador said had been mentioned to Mr. Grew by the Japanese Foreign Minister, shortly before Mr. Grew left Tokyo.

In regard to the first point I referred to the fact that for six years I had been urging upon his Government the view that the world was large enough for all nations and that great progress of the whole world would flow from cooperation along progressive and mutually helpful lines.

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Washington.

In regard to the second point I said that while existing American rights and interests in the Far East are very important a paramount consideration was whether all of China and the adjacent islands were to be disposed of by Japan as was Manchuria, with the observance of treaties abolished, international law destroyed and the door shut and locked except as to preference for Japanese subjects. I said that I need not speculate upon how Japan would feel if it were announced that the western hemisphere and a part of Europe were to be foreclosed against Japan in a similar way. I observed that the interference which was taking place beyond all possible military requirements with the rights and interests of third power nationals all over China aroused resentment of the governments whose nationals are thus affected, that Japanese businessmen were being permitted to step in to the places of American and other businessmen who were being obliged to abandon their businesses, and that it was these circumstances and indications which gave rise to American apprehension that, as the "Manchuria-izing" of all China proceeded, American rights and interests might be permanently jeopardized or held in abeyance by Japan.

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Washington.

I also pointed out, speaking from my viewpoint, that efforts by any nation to dominate a large part of the world could result only in disaster to all and that I had endeavored for six years to urge this general idea upon Japanese statesmen.

H. H. H.

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Sent by operator M. 19.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 10, 1939.


SUBJECT: American rights and interests in China.

*Copies sent to Tokyo +
Peiping (Chungking)*

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KEMBUKE HORINOSUKE.

77-94/15 Mar

COPIES TO:



Copy sent to President, July 25 1939

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77-94/15236

The Japanese Ambassador came in at my request. I then proceeded, without particular preliminaries, to read him the following:

"On two occasions between midnight and 2:00 a.m., July 6, two squadrons of Japanese planes raided Chungking. Bombs fell at random on both banks of the Yangtze River and in the city. One bomb fell within 400 feet of the residence of the Counselor of the American Embassy. Other bombs fell in the same general neighborhood, one landing about 300 yards from the residence of the American Ambassador. The Lewis Memorial Institutional Church at Chungking, an American institution, was badly damaged.

"Another

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"Another raid was made by Japanese planes on Chungking on July 7 commencing about 12:40 a.m., and lasting until about 2:10 a.m. On this occasion bombs fell in various areas of the city and also on the south bank of the Yangtze, one bomb falling within 50 yards of the quarters of the Counselor of the American Embassy and causing about 30 Chinese civilian casualties.

"During these raids five bombs struck within 200 yards of the U.S.S. TUTUILA.

"The bombing appears to have been carried out in an indiscriminate manner and the damage and loss of life inflicted to have been confined almost exclusively to civilians. The Government of the United States has repeatedly expressed this country's abhorrence of such indiscriminate bombing. Added to this general humanitarian concern is the consideration that the bombings under discussion, which are but the most recent of a long list of similar bombings, have exposed to grave hazards the American ambassador, his staff, an American naval vessel and American naval personnel thereon, and all other Americans at Chungking.

"The President in person has asked that the Secretary of State protest to the Japanese Ambassador against a continuation of these indiscriminate bombings. The

President

- 3 -

President would like to have an immediate statement from the Japanese Government, without making the matter one of a formal exchange of notes."

At the conclusion of the reading, I handed the Ambassador a copy of what I had read. He began to indicate his lack of belief in the facts, by saying that his Government had given special instructions to the military authorities in China to be careful to avoid injuries to persons and properties of other nations, etc., etc. I interrupted him and said that without taking up the question of what kind of instructions the military authorities were under from Tokyo, the official facts speak for themselves and show clearly, that the Japanese military authorities are proceeding indiscriminately and recklessly with bombings in and about Chungking; that I was speaking from the facts, while the Ambassador was speaking from his understanding that instructions to be careful in bombing had been issued. He then abandoned this phase. I said that, of course, if this sort of reckless bombing went on something serious in the way of injuries to other nationals and their properties would inevitably occur, and, that in the interest of both his country and mine, my Government seeks to avoid such an unfortunate development. The

, Ambassador

- 4 -

Ambassador then said he would promptly transmit the written statement I had read to him to his Government.

He then referred to a conversation between Ambassador Grew and Foreign Minister Arita, before the Ambassador recently left Tokyo for America, in which Mr. Arita had brought up (1) the idea of our two countries exercising their influence toward avoiding war in Europe; (2) the reported apprehension of my Government that the Japanese occupation of the Hainan Islands is part of a plan of permanent military conquest; and (3) my Government's concern about the extent of possible injury and loss of American interests, including American trade, in China, by reason of possible permanent Japanese policies of control. He said he would be interested in anything I might have to say on these points.

Point 3. I said that, taking the last point first, I need not remind him that for six years I had been earnestly pleading with and urging upon his Government the view that there is enough room on this planet for fifteen or eighteen great nations like his and mine, and that by cooperating along progressive and mutually desirable lines, great progress of the entire world population would gradually follow, etc., etc.

Point 2. -

- 5 -

Point 2. I said that, on the other hand, while present American interests and rights in the Far East are highly important, the big consideration relates to the question whether all of China and the Pacific islands skirting it is to be Manchuria-ized by Japan, with international law destroyed and treaty observation abolished and all other nations not allowed into that one-half of the world - the door shut and locked by Japan except over preferences for her own citizens. I added that if some one nation is to do this in one-half of the world, some other nation in the other half of the world might undertake to follow the same example, and nothing would be more absurdly impossible for the future progress of the population of the world, including the countries assuming this species of domination, than such attempted course. I proceeded further to say that the Ambassador might suppose an announcement that this hemisphere and a part of Europe would be foreclosed against his country in the sense of being Manchuria-ized, and added that I need not speculate on what his country would think and how it would feel. I said that such efforts at domination, with no facilities for financing and progressive development, and the going forward on
such

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such a huge scale, would only result in disaster for all concerned, speaking, of course, from my viewpoint, and that this general idea had been urged by me on his statesmen for six years.

The Ambassador undertook to advance the idea that Japan was just interfering temporarily with other people's interests on account of military exigencies. To this I replied that the fact that the rights and interests of other nationals all over China are being seriously interfered with, beyond all possible military requirements or even pretext, gives rise to the disappointment, not to say resentment, of the governments whose nationals are thus affected; that these excesses have occurred in north China and in South China and all up and down the Yangtze River; that Americans and other nationals are required to abandon their businesses, while the Japanese businessmen are permitted to step in and take their places and carry on business almost as usual - not temporarily, but apparently indefinitely. I added that these signs and circumstances indicating the Manchurization of all China, or an attempt to do so at least, gives rise to the American apprehension, to which the Ambassador referred, that American trade and other
interests

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interests might be permanently jeopardized or held in abeyance by Japan.

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Point 1. As to the question raised with Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Arita about the possible cooperation of our two countries to compose the threatened dangers of Europe, I said that the single test of my Government in dealing with other Governments relates to the question of peace; that we consider the preservation of peace so supremely important to the future of all nations that we draw the line between honest, law-abiding, peaceful countries and peoples, without reference to their form of government, on the one hand, and those who are flouting law and order and officially threatening military conquest without limit as to time or extent; that we will work in a friendly spirit with every peaceful nation to promote and preserve peace, without serious thought as to who they are; that while we have not the slightest alliance, or secret or other understandings with any nation on earth, and do not propose to have any, we will keep thoroughly armed and prepared to take care of our interests and rights; that we have, in the spirit I was describing, made every kind and character of plea to the countries of Europe to indicate a willingness for the peaceful settlement and adjustment of their economic
and

- 8 -

and other relations, and we have indicated our readiness to cooperate in every feasible plan to restore international trade and finance to a normal basis; that, notwithstanding these earnest pleas, (which the Japanese Government itself might well have been making, if it has not been doing so, or might well make now and persistently in the future,) nations perhaps could not but take notice that Japan herself is engaged in military operations for purposes of conquest, and that this situation might well call for an ending, if Japan were to exercise her fullest influence along with the United States and other countries in efforts to compose threatened military conquest in other parts of the world.

The Ambassador made no particular comment, except to state that there had been reports in this country to the effect that Japan might enter into a military pact with Germany and Italy, whereas the truth is that his country has no idea of doing so; that Japan, because of its proximity and difficulties with Russia, has been interested in the anti-Comintern policy of certain European states and in working with them against Bolshevism. I replied that, of course, this was primarily the business of his country; that my country, of course, strongly
opposes

oppose the doctrine of isolation, and he will be true to this; that it also, as I had indicated, abstains from any entanglements or involvements with European countries; that, of course, if Japan desires to tie herself up with the horribly complicated European controversies, so as to make herself immediately involved in any European war, that still was her business primarily; and I might again reiterate that my Government is keeping itself in a detached position, with peace as its supreme objective, and with armaments sufficient for all purposes of security.

- - - -

The Ambassador again and finally indicated that he would present my written statement, regarding bombing of American nationals and property, to his Government. I again emphasized that, in my opinion, something serious would inevitably occur if this sort of reckless conduct should continue; that, of course, we were making complaint primarily from this viewpoint and in the end it should be highly to the interest of both Governments thus to deal with dangerous practices before something happens of a serious nature; that my Government, of course, desires to preserve relations of fair-play and fair-dealing and friendliness with all nations at all disposed to this end.

I said

HRE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)

TOKYO

Dated July 31, 1939

FROM
Rec'd 4:10 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

376, July 31, 11 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

PLEASE RESTRICT DISTRIBUTION.

Instruction No. 1767 of July 8 transmitting the text of the reply to the Prime Minister's message has been received and as directed I submit comment as follows

One. The text of the proposed reply combines frankness with measured language and seems to me to be perfectly clear. As it addresses itself specifically to the Prime Minister's formal message delivered through Mr. Grew, there occurs to me no (repeat no) suggestion for change in the text.

Two. With regard to the question of opportuneness have no doubt whatever that the reply, if delivered now, would heavily emphasize the impression in official circles as elsewhere in Japan that the United States has now initiated a definitely positive attitude toward Far Eastern problems. If that is the effect which the Department desires to obtain the sooner the reply is delivered the more effective it will be.

Three

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CUE

HRE

2-#376 From Tokyo July 31, 11 p.m.

Three. Although I have carefully studied the draft reply in the light of the Department's 196, July 13, 6 p.m., I desire the Department's further guidance as to what I should say to the Prime Minister concerning his definite proposal with regard to the holding of an international conference to be called by the President to discuss problems causing world unrest including Far Eastern problems. It has been quite definitely suggested to me that the message which was handed to Mr. Grew and which contained no concrete proposal was intended as an opening for the move which the Prime Minister made a few days later when he asked that I communicate his proposal in the strictest confidence to you and the President.

Four. I lay before the Department the following suggestion as to procedure on this last point (A) if notwithstanding the invitation in the draft reply for "further information" the Department does not desire to explore the proposal for an international conference that I invite the Prime Minister to read between the lines of the reply which I am to hand to the Foreign Minister; or (B) if the Department is in process of studying the proposal, that I so inform the Prime Minister and add that the reply which I am to hand to the Foreign Minister is addressed only to the message delivered to Mr. Grew and that a reply to his proposal will be forthcoming in due course.

NPL:NK

DOOMAN

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR

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Department of State

Charge Department:
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1939 AUG 1 PM Washington, August 1, 1939.

Charge to \$

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Your 376, July 31, 11 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. The Department has re-examined the text of the proposed reply in the light of the comments contained in your telegram under reference. Although we can appreciate that some of the statements contained in the reply, if taken by themselves, might tend toward creating an impression somewhat along the lines suggested in your paragraph numbered two, it does not repeat not seem to us that the message viewed as a whole need give or emphasize the impression which you estimate that it would. We therefore would welcome further clarification of the thought suggested in the first sentence of your numbered paragraph two.

Two. In the view of the Department our proposed message answers both the Prime Minister's message handed to Mr. Grew and the Prime Minister's subsequent proposal communicated through you which we construe as an elaboration of the message. As stated in the Department's

Enciphered by .

Sent by operator

M. . . . 19

740.00/1931

GMB

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Washington.

Charge to
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196, July 13, 6 p.m. / our reply / thus / includes / indication
of / our / general / reaction / to the / views / reported / in your /
242, May 23, 11 p.m. /

Three. / As the / matter / appears / to the / Department,
neither / repeat / neither of the / alternative / procedures /
suggested in your / numbered / paragraph / four / need be /
adopted. We believe that / the reply / needs no / repeat / no /
explanatory / comment / and that / when you / deliver / it / you
should make no / repeat / no / interpretative / comment / other
than / to say, / if / expressly / asked, that / the reply / is /
meant to / cover / both the / Prime Minister's / written / message /
and his / statements / reported / in your telegram no. / 242, / 50
May 23, / 11 p.m. /

224

Four. / The Department / is sending / you / by / separate
telegram the text of a / change / which the / Department
desires / be made / in the / text of the / reply. / 1531

Five. / Upon receipt / from you of the / clarification re-
quested in / paragraph / one / above, the / Department will / expect
to send you / definitive / instructions / with regard to the
question of / when the reply / should be / delivered. /

[Handwritten initials]

JME
FEJWB:RES

FE

PA/H

[Handwritten signature]

Enciphered by .

Sent by operator

M.

. 19

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Department of State

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Day letter
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Washington,

August 2, 1939.

Charge to

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AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Reference Department's mail instruction no. 1767

of July 8. On page 3 of the enclosure, lines 5 and 6, please substitute for the words QUOTE especially with regard to the methods of Japan in relations with China UNQUOTE the words QUOTE especially with regard to various declared Japanese aims and to various methods and instrumentalities which various Japanese agencies employ in pursuit thereof UNQUOTE.

Melby
Acting

740.00/1531

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AUG 2 1939 12

FE:MMH:HES

FE
to mvd

PA/H

U

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____ 19____

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ML

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Tokyo

Dated August 3, 1939

FROM

Rec'd 10:45 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

Handwritten notes:
H
Telegram to Tokyo
Aug. 4.

384, August 3, 4 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 235, August 1, 8 p.m.

Before proceeding to clarify the points discussed in paragraph one of the Department's telegram under reference I must correct a misunderstanding which I have inadvertently permitted the Department to form by failing to stress that it has been represented to me, and I believe correctly, that knowledge of the Prime Minister's proposal with regard to an international conference is confined only to his entourage. (Please see last two sentences page 8 of Deep Tech No. 79300 June 21.) The Hon. Ambassador has no knowledge of the project as directly indicated by the fact that both he and the Vice Minister, whom I have just received by the Prime Minister's order, on separate occasions with the Prime Minister's knowledge (I am referring to the Prime Minister). I believe that this fact may help to explain my feeling that the Prime Minister's proposal is confidential, I have permitted myself to reply herewith to the official reply to all official messages.

740.00/2007

FILED

1939

Two.

ML -2- from Tokyo Aug. 3, 10:45 a.m. #384

Two. With regard to the point which I am desired to clarify, I am strongly impressed by the primary significance which is generally attached in Japan to the fact that notice of termination of the commercial treaty was given by the United States without prior intimation as there would have been had the action been motivated in large part by economic considerations. The deduction that the motivating considerations were political in character is confirmed by noting American press and other popular reaction to the notice of termination.

(END SECTION ONE)

DOOLAN

WIC:RR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C) Tokyo
 FROM: August 4, 1939

Rec'd: 11:25 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

7:4, August 3, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

I find no dissent either in the press or among individual Japanese from the conclusion that the recent American action demonstrated a positive American attitude. There is, however, considerable uncertainty as to the course of action which might cause the United States to give effect to that attitude by further decisive action and conversely silent on field within which American and Japanese policies can be respectively pursued without conflicting with each other. Every action and statement of Chinese attitude is now being microscopically examined in the hope of finding a clue towards solving these questions.

Three. I realize that there are considerations leading to the action taken by our Government last week which fall entirely outside the field of my observation and which made necessary a step obviously falling within the realm of high policy. But I feel that before this correspondence is closed I should record my estimate of the effects which will be produced by delivery of the reply in the form decided upon by
 the

ML #2- from Tokyo, Aug. 3, 10:35 a.m. #384 Sec.2

the Department. I believe that the reply would be interpreted (a) by the Japanese Government as an indication that the attitude now taken by the American Government requires the termination of the conflict with China as a condition precedent to the betterment by Japan of her relations with the United States; and (b) by the Prime Minister as a closing of the door to insure peace in the Far East. (END MESSAGE)

DOOMAN

HR:DDM

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
AS CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PARTIAL
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,
August 4, 1945

44-23881

BY (AFAN).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

204334, August 3, 4 p.m.

One. With reference to your suggestion that the Prime Minister's personal and confidential move merits a reply separate from the written reply to his written message, we feel that as his move was made orally you might, subsequent to the delivery of our written reply, indicate to him or to some appropriate official in his immediate entourage that, in view of the statement contained in your numbered paragraph one of your 242 of May 23, 11 p.m., we construed his proposal as an elaboration of his message and for this reason the written reply thus includes indication of the reaction to the Prime Minister's confidential views.

Two. We find it difficult to understand your statement that knowledge of the Prime Minister's proposal is probably confined to the Prime Minister's entourage in the light of the statement made to you by the Polish Ambassador as reported in your 265, June 8, 7 p.m., that the Foreign Minister had informed the Polish

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

740.00/2007

GMB

Confidential File

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Washington.

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Ambassador that the views of the American Government in regard to the possibility of Japan and the United States collaborating to bring about a detente in Europe were being explored. Also, the British Government some time ago approached the Department and stated that it had heard a report along this line and inquired as to the attitude of this Government.

Three. It would appear from your comment that it is the reaction in Japan to the action of this Government in giving notice of intention to terminate the commercial treaty, rather than anything in the tone or contents of the proposed reply itself, which, if the reply should be delivered now, would in your opinion be likely to emphasize the impression that the United States has now initiated a definitely positive attitude toward Far Eastern problems. The reply was prepared a number of weeks ago and was addressed solely to the contents of the Prime Minister's message as amplified by his subsequent comment. It is realized, however, that the reply, although it has no repeat no reference to the question of treaty termination, might, if delivered now, tend to cause the reactions you anticipate. In as much as it has not repeat not been and is not repeat not the Department's intention that the reply be interpreted as related to the question of treaty termination the

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Washington,

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Department authorizes you to withhold its delivery for a short time if in your judgment such delay would be likely to render the reply less susceptible to such interpretation.

Four. When delivering the reply please bear in mind the Department's desire, as indicated in the last paragraph of the Department's mail instruction no. 1767 of July 8 that the reply be regarded as strictly confidential.

Handwritten signature
Acting

FE:JWB:HJN/HES

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator ... M. 19

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MA _____ Tokyo
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone. FROM
(C) Rec'd 12:45 p.m.

Dated August 5, 1939

Secretary of State

Washington

389, August 5, 9 p.m.



STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 242, August 4, 3 p.m.

One. I very greatly appreciate the authorization granted me by the Department to make or convey to the Prime Minister the explanatory statement indicated by the Department.

Two. With regard to the question raised by the Department in the second paragraph of its telegram under reference I do not (repeat not) have the impression from anything said to me by the Polish Ambassador during our conversation on June 8 or in any subsequent conversation that the Foreign Minister had told him anything on that subject which does not lie within the four corners of the message handed to Mr. Grew on May 18. That message was indeed an effort to explore the possibility of an American-Japanese detente in Europe but does not itself go so far as to propose for consideration as the Prime Minister did subsequently ^{to} me the calling of an international conference to discuss business interests as well as European problems.

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FILED

MS -2- tel # 389, August 5, 9 p.m. from Tokyo

problems. With regard to the inquiry at the Department of the British Ambassador, Craigie asked me about two months ago whether I could clarify a report he had heard (presumably from the Polish Ambassador) to the effect that the Japanese Government had approached our Government with regard to the situation in Europe, and I replied that as the Department alone was in a position to decide whether any information on this matter should be given to the British Government, inquiry would best be made in Washington.

Three. The Department will note from our immediately following telegram that the timing of the delivery of the reply has been further complicated by reported important developments in Tokyo. My inclination is to withhold action

~~of the report for the present.~~

DOGMAN

EPL

(7) ~~At each omission.~~

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DIVISION OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AUG 14 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This telegram must be
closely safeguarded
and not being communicated
to anyone. (SR 4 C)

FROM TOKYO
Dated August 6, 1939
Rec'd 2 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

8:40, August 5, 10 p.m.

ur 388, August 4, 7 p.m.

One. I heard today from two reliable sources that
the army supported by a joint recommendation by the Japanese
Ambassadors at Berlin and Rome are again vigorously press-
ing the government for an alliance with Germany and
Italy. My informants said that the government is
absolutely opposing the proposal and has staked its
existence on the issue and that if the government should
fall the next Prime Minister would probably be General
Araki although one informant made the statement that a
strong effort would be made by his friends to bring for-
ward General Ugaki.

Two. **STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.** The Minister of the
Navy referring to reports of this character during the
course of a conversation which I had with him upon the
subject said, "The demagogues are getting busy again
with their propoganda". He expressed confidence that this
new effort of those he described as desperadoes would be
fought off.

Three.

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G-J

Handwritten notes:
for Mr. [unclear]
[unclear] 8/4/39

FILED
AUG 11 1939

100-370-100 Tokyo, August 5, 1941

While the officials today live with rumors-- that an attempt is made to assassinate Iwah, Foreign Minister of Japan, and the King of England; that the King of England has received a message to the Emperor recommending withdrawal of Japan's attitude toward Great Britain; that military movements against the Soviet Union are to be taken in the near future and so on. Whatever element of truth there may be in them has undoubtedly been greatly exaggerated by the media currency of such sensational rumors is significant.

DOUGLAS

100

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely examined and re-
ported to the committee
immediately. (2)

FROM

London, August 1, 1939

Re: [unclear]

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEC 2 1939
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

London, August 1, 4 p.m.

URGENT. CONFIDENTIAL.

London, August 1, 4 p.m.

The Prime Minister's personal reply to the
 telegram of this nature. I was informed that
 the Prime Minister was expected to deliver
 a personal reply to the telegram of this nature.
 I had been in the position since
 yesterday to deliver the reply to the Foreign Office
 but I had informed the department that in view of
 the political developments I was inclined
 to defer the reply for the present. I had, however,
 the Prime Minister had expressed desire to have
 the reply as soon as possible I would deliver it at
 once to the Foreign Office. I asked Fujii to call again
 at noon. I thereupon delivered the reply in person
 to Yoshizawa who received the document without comment
 and delivery to the Foreign Minister. Upon my
 return from the Foreign Office Fujii called again. I

GAVE

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FILED

1939

STATE

-2- #332, August 3, 4 p.m., from Tokyo.

gave him a copy of the reply and said that it included, for the reasons specified in paragraph one of the Department's 242, August 4, 3 p.m., indication of the Secretary's reaction of the Prime Minister's confidential views.

Two. Fujii's comment was that the reply seemed to be addressed to the Prime Minister's written message and looked as if that light, would be thought to be well received by his principal. He said that he would see the Prime Minister again this evening after the five minister conference (called to discuss the alliance with Germany and Italy).

Three. I marked the reply strictly confidential and told both Yoshizawa and Fujii that it was not (repeat not) to be published.

DOONAN

OSF